Banks’ capital, regulation and the financial crisis by Teixeira, João et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WOR
CEEA
 
 
 
Bank
Crisis
 
João C
Francis
Ana V. 
Ana C.
 
 
Decem
KING P
plA WP
s’ Capi
 
.A. Teixei
co J. F. S
Fernande
 G. Alves 
ber 2013 
APER S
 No. 03/
tal, Reg
ra 
ilva 
s 
ERIES
2013 
ulation
 
 and the Finan
 
cial 
Universid
Universid
ade dos Aç
ade da Mad
ores 
eira 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks’ Capital, Regulation and the Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
João C.A. Teixeira 
Universidade dos Açores (DEG e CEEAplA) 
 
Francisco J. F. Silva 
Universidade dos Açores (DEG e CEEAplA) 
 
Ana V. Fernandes 
Universidade dos Açores (DEG) 
 
Ana C. G. Alves  
Universidade dos Açores (DEG) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper n.º 03/2013 
dezembro de 2013 
CEEAplA Working Paper n.º 03/2013 
dezembro de 2013 
 
 
RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
Banks’ Capital, Regulation and the Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
This paper investigates whether regulatory capital requirements play an 
important role in determining banks’ equity capital. We estimate equity capital 
regressions using panel data of a sample of 560 banks for 2004-2010. Our 
results suggest that regulatory capital requirements are not first order 
determinants of banks’ capital structure. We document differences on the effect 
of most factors on banks’ share of equity according to the type of bank and to 
the region of the bank. Finally, we show that the determinants of this share are 
sensitive to the recent international financial crisis and to a set of regulatory 
country factors. 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether regulatory capital requirements play an important role 
in determining banks’ equity capital. We estimate equity capital regressions using panel 
data of a sample of 560 banks for 2004-2010. Our results suggest that regulatory capital 
requirements are not first order determinants of banks’ capital structure. We document 
differences on the effect of most factors on banks’ share of equity according to the type 
of bank and to the region of the bank. Finally, we show that the determinants of this 
share are sensitive to the recent international financial crisis and to a set of regulatory 
country factors. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent international financial crisis started in the financial sector and quickly turned 
into a global recession with an unprecedented effect on the investment and capital 
structure decisions made by executives of non-financial firms. The effect in the banking 
sector is even more problematic as, unlike most non-financial firms, regulation plays an 
important role in the way banks organize their activity. As far as the capital structure 
decision is concerned, banks have to comply with capital requirements resulting from 
Basel I, II and more recently from Basel III. Therefore, it is important to study the 
determinants of banks’ capital structure. In particular, is important to investigate 
whether banks’ capital structure is fully determined by regulation. If not, which bank-
specific factors are really important in determining banks’ capital structure? Is the 
proportion of banks’ equity capital determined by the same set of factors that determine 
the capital structure of non-financial firms?  This paper addresses these questions and 
also examines the effect of the recent international financial crisis on banks’ share of 
equity capital.  
 Using panel data of a sample of 560 banks, 379 from the U.S.A. and 181 from 
Europe, spanning 23 countries, for the period 2004-2010, we find that the factors 
affecting the capital structure of non-financial firms play an important role in explaining 
banks’ capital structure. This suggests that regulation may not be a first order 
determinant of banks’ share of equity capital. In fact, we document a strong similarity in 
the factors affecting the capital structure of banks and those of non-financial firms. This 
result is in line with those documented in the related studies of Barber and Lyon (1997) 
and Gropp and Heider (2010), who find that the relationship between leverage and 
profitability, size, market-to-book ratios and stock returns extends to banks.  
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 A further investigation on the determinants of banks’ equity capital in our 
sample reveals that the buffer view of banks’ capital structure, as discussed by Gropp 
and Heider (2010), is not validated. According to the buffer view, banks hold capital 
buffers in excess of the regulatory minimum because raising equity on short notice in 
order to avoid violating the capital requirement is costly. Moreover, our results do not 
support Mishkin (2000) argument that banks’ managers often hold less capital than is 
required by regulation in order to avoid the high costs of holding capital.  
 Our paper departs from the empirical corporate finance literature that has 
examined the determinants of capital structure of non-financial firms. Starting with the 
seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the most relevant papers in this field 
include Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009). These authors have analyzed a set of firm-specific 
and market factors that are consistently related to the capital structure of non-financial 
firms. While these authors typically estimate corporate finance regressions where the 
dependent variable is the leverage ratio, either measured in market or book terms, we 
are especially concerned with the determinants of the equity capital that banks hold in 
excess of the regulatory minimum.  
 We examine the determinants of banks’ equity capital as follows. First, we 
estimate standard corporate finance regression models of equity capital where the 
dependent variable is the share of equity capital in excess of the regulatory minimum of 
4%, either measured in book or market terms, and the explanatory variables are a set of 
bank-specific and market factors. We use the same set of firm-specific factors 
commonly used in the corporate finance literature to explain banks’ capital structure, 
namely the market-to-book ratio, profitability, size, collateral, whether the bank is a 
dividend payer and asset risk. As market variables we consider the GDP growth, 
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inflation, the volatility of the national stock index and the term structure spread. We 
also estimate a regression for the Tier 1 capital ratio in excess of the regulatory 
minimum of 4%. We hypothesize that if bank-specific factors have an effect on banks’ 
share of equity in excess of the regulatory minimum, then regulation is not a first order 
determinant of banks’ capital structure. Next, if this hypothesis is confirmed, we 
examine the sign of the effect of each bank-specific factor on the excess equity capital 
in order to verify whether this sign is in accordance with the predictions of the empirical 
corporate finance literature or the predictions of the buffer view of capital.
 Second, we investigate potential differences in the results of the excess capital 
model according to the region to where the bank has its headquarters (United States 
versus Europe) and to the type of bank considered, by comparing categories of banks 
based on size, growth opportunities and leverage. This analysis is conducted by adding 
to the original excess capital model a set of variables that are the multiplication of each 
explanatory variables and a dummy variable intended to capture the region of the bank, 
its size, growth opportunities or level of leverage.  
 Third, we analyze the effect of the recent international financial crisis in the 
results of the excess capital model by adding to the model a dummy variable intended to 
capture the time period of the crisis. We develop an analysis that allows us to discuss 
whether each explanatory variable has the same effect on the excess capital for the 
period before the international financial crisis (2004 to 2007) and during the 
international financial crisis (2008 to 2010). 
 Finally, we conduct a more detailed analysis of the effect of regulation on banks’ 
proportion of equity in excess of the regulatory minimum by adding to the original 
excess capital model several variables intended to capture the regulatory framework of 
the country to where the bank belongs. Through the use of dummy year variables, we 
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compare the effect of the regulatory variables on the excess equity capital over the years 
of our sample period in order to investigate a potential temporal effect of regulation on 
capital structure.  
 We contribute to the literature on the determinants of banks’ capital structure as 
follows. We extend the time period of the study developed by Gropp and Heider (2010) 
by considering four years before the international financial crisis (2004 to 2007) and 
three years during the same crisis (2008 to 2010). This allows us to discuss the effect of 
the international financial crisis on banks’ capital structure. Furthermore, unlike other 
studies, we discuss potential differences in the results according to the region to where 
the bank belongs and to the type of bank considered. 
We also contribute to the literature that examines the effect of regulation on 
banks’ capital structure. As in Brewer et al. (2008), we provide a direct test for the 
effect of regulation on capital structure and, following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012), we 
examine the existence of a temporal pattern of this effect. In addition, as in Bart et al. 
(2005), Berger et al. (2008) and Brewer et al. (2008), we find empirical evidence that 
banks hold capital in excess of the regulatory minimum.  
Our results suggest that capital regulation and buffers are not a first order 
determinant of banks’ capital structure. An alternative view of banks’ capital structure is 
proposed by Flannery (1994), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000) and 
Allen et al. (2009). They argue that banks, like non-financial firms, may be optimizing 
their capital structure, relegating for a second order importance regulatory capital 
requirements. The market discipline theories also relegate for a second order importance 
capital requirements. For instance, Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001), Martinez and Schmuckler (2001), Calomiris and Wilson (2004), Ashcraft 
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(2008) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) suggest that banks’ capital structures are the 
outcome of pressures arising from shareholders, debtholders and depositors, and that 
regulatory capital requirements may be non-binding and of second order importance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates 
whether capital regulation fully determines banks’ share of equity capital and presents 
the model of the determinants of banks’ capital in excess of the regulatory minimum, 
followed by the predictions of the empirical corporate finance literature and the buffer 
view of capital. Section 3 examines the data and the descriptive statistics of the main 
variables. Section 4 debates our findings for the main model and further examines 
potential differences in the results based on the region to where the bank belongs and to 
the type of bank considered. It also analyzes the effect of the recent international 
financial crisis on the results and provides a direct test for the effect of regulation on 
capital structure. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. The determinants of banks’ capital structure 
In this section we investigate whether the standard determinants of capital structure for 
non-financial firms also apply to banks. This analysis provides a first glance on the 
potential effect of capital regulation on banks’ proportion of equity owned. If capital 
regulation is the primary determinant of banks’ capital structure, there should be little or 
no explanatory power of the common firms’ or banks’ specific factors that determine 
capital structure (Gropp and Heider (2010)). We first present the model of banks’ excess 
capital in excess of the regulatory minimum by describing its econometric specification 
and subsequently discuss the expected relation between each explanatory variable and 
this excess capital, according to the corporate finance literature and the buffer view of 
capital. 
 The corporate finance literature has identified a set of firm specific factors that 
play an important role in determining the capital structure of non-financial firms. From 
Titman and Wessels (1988), to Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009), 
the literature seems to agree on the relevance of firms’ growth opportunities, 
profitability, size, tangibility and risk for the firms’ capital structure decision. As in 
Gropp and Heider (2010), we use this set of factors and incorporate another one that 
accounts for whether the bank is a dividend payer.  
 If our analysis shows that these banks’ specific factors are indeed important 
determinants of banks’ capital structure, we conclude that regulatory capital 
requirements are of second order importance and we then compare the predictions of the 
corporate finance literature with those of the buffer view of capital regarding how these 
factors affect banks’ proportion of equity capital.  
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 According to the buffer view of capital, in order to avoid the costs associated 
with issuing new equity capital at short notice, banks tend to hold capital buffers or 
discretionary capital above the regulatory minimum. As Wall and Peterson (1987), 
Barrios and Blanco (2003), Ayuso et al. (2004) and Peura and Keppo (2006) point out, 
we should therefore expect more equity capital or less leverage for banks facing higher 
costs of issuing equity. These costs of issuing equity are caused by asymmetric 
information, as in Myers and Majluf (1984).2 
 We define the regression equation for the share of capital in excess of the 
regulatory minimum as follows:  
                                     ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏ ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௜ ௧ ൌ ߚ଴൅ߚଵ ௜ܺ ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜ ௧                     (1) 
where Excess capital is the equity capital ratio in excess of the regulatory minimum 
capital of 4%, measured either in market or book terms, or the regulatory Tier 1 capital 
ratio, also in excess of 4%.  ௜ܺ ௧ିଵ is a set of one year lagged bank-specific factors, 
including the market-to-book ratio (measure of growth opportunities), profitability, the 
natural logarithm of total assets (measure of size), collateral (measure of tangibility), a 
dummy for dividend payers and the natural logarithm of asset volatility (measure of 
asset risk) for bank i in year t, whereas ܯ௧ିଵ is a vector of one year lagged 
macroeconomic variables, including the GDP growth, inflation, the natural logarithm of 
the stock market volatility and the term structure of interest rates. The term u is the 
stochastic error.3  
                                                            
2 Wall and Peterson (1987) conjecture the existence of a buffer in their empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory factors on 
bank capital determination. Barrios and Blanco (2003), Ayuso et al. (2004), and Peura and Keppo (2006) provide formal models of 
the determination of such a buffer. 
3 In section 4.3 we further incorporate in this model a set of regulatory country control variables in order to examine the direct effect 
of regulation on the excess capital hold by banks.  
9 
 
We now provide the specification of each variable and the expected relation 
between the explanatory variables and the excess equity capital, in line with the 
predictions of the corporate finance literature and the buffer view of capital. Table 1 
provides a summary of the variables definition. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
We measure the market equity capital ratio as the ratio of the market value of 
equity to market value of assets and the book equity capital ratio as the ratio of the book 
value of equity to book value of assets. The market value of equity is given by the 
number of shares times the end of the year stock price, while the market value of assets 
is the sum of the market value of equity and book value of liabilities. As regards the 
Tier 1 capital ratio, it consists of the book value of equity over assets weighted by risk, 
as defined in Basel I. Risk-weighted assets are the total of all assets held by the bank 
weighted by credit risk according to a formula determined by the regulator, usually the 
country's central bank. Most of these banks follow the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision guidelines for the formulae of asset risk weights. The Basel I agreement 
established a minimum Tier 1 capital ratio of 4%, and this value was later maintained in 
the Basel II agreement.  We should note that the book equity capital ratio understates 
the Tier 1 capital ratio given that the latter considers assets weighted by risk in the 
denominator.    
The empirical corporate finance literature, from Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2009), has found a positive relation 
between growth opportunities and equity capital, a result that agrees with the 
predictions of the tradeoff theory that more growth opportunities enhances costs of 
financial distress, highlights agency costs of debt and reduces free cash flow problems. 
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Alternatively, the buffer view of capital argues that banks with more growth 
opportunities tend to have less equity, as higher growth opportunities are associated 
with less costs of issuing equity capital at short notice and, therefore, for these banks it 
is not necessary to hold so much capital above the regulatory minimum. Based on 
Myers and Majluf (1984) asymmetric information argument, Gropp and Heider (2010) 
suggests that this happens because banks with higher growth opportunities are either 
better known to outsiders, can obtain a better price or have a stronger financial position. 
In line with most empirical studies, we use the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for 
growth opportunities. This ratio is defined as the market value of assets over the book 
value of assets. 
 As regards profitability, according to the agency theory of capital structure more 
profitable firms tend to use more debt due to the disciplining role that debt has on 
managers, as more debt is associated with a reduction in free cash flow (Jensen (1986)). 
On the contrary, the pecking order theory predicts that more profitable firms tend to be 
less levered because these firms are willing to use internal financing rather than debt 
financing (Myers (1993)). Frank and Goyal (2009) reports that most empirical studies in 
corporate finance have found a positive relation between profitability and equity capital, 
a result that suggests a rejection of the tradeoff theory of capital structure, in particular 
the agency hypothesis, and a validation of the pecking order theory. As for the buffer 
view of capital, we should expect more profitable banks to have less equity in excess of 
the regulatory minimum since these banks face lower costs of issuing capital at short 
notice. The argument, as discussed in Gropp and Heider (2010), is that banks with 
higher profits are either better known to outsiders or have greater financial robustness. 
We measure profitability as the ratio of pre-tax profits and interest expenses over the 
book value of assets. 
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 The effect of firm’s size on the equity capital ratio is expected to be negative 
according to most empirical papers, a finding that supports the predictions of the 
tradeoff theory. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1998), Booth et al. 
(2001), Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2009) consider that larger 
firms tend to be more levered as they are likely to face lower default risk. Yet, as 
discussed by Gropp and Heider (2010), according to the buffer view there is not a clear 
relation between size and the share of capital owned by banks. On one hand, larger 
banks may have larger buffers if they are more complex, due to the effect of asymmetric 
information and, on the other hand, larger banks may have smaller buffers in case they 
are better known to the market and can issue equity capital more easily on the short run. 
We define banks’ size as the value of total assets. 
 The empirical corporate finance literature has found a negative relation between 
asset tangibility and the equity capital ratio, a result that is usually explained by the 
important effect of tangibility on the reduction of costs of financial distress and on the 
mitigation of debt-related agency problems. Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that 
tangible assets are easier for outsiders to value, which causes a reduction in expected 
financial distress costs. Moreover, in line with Jensen and Meckling (1986), tangibility 
contributes to reduce the asset substitution effect as it makes more difficult to substitute 
high-risk for low-risk assets and, as a consequence, increases leverage and reduces 
equity capital. For financial firms tangibility is commonly defined as collateral and, as 
regards the banking literature and the buffer view, there is no clear prediction on how 
collateral affects the proportion of equity capital. Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 
(2012) we measure collateral as the sum of total securities, treasury bills, other bills, 
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bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks and lands and buildings over the book value of 
assets. 
 As far as the dividend variable is concerned, while the corporate finance 
literature reports a positive relation between dividend payments and the equity ratio, the 
buffer view predicts a negative effect of dividends on capital buffers. The documented 
effect of the corporate finance literature relies on the pecking order theory argument that 
firms with higher profits and potentially with higher dividends prefer to use internal 
financing rather than external financing through debt. Nevertheless, the buffer view 
predicts that more profitable banks or banks that pay dividends more often are 
potentially exposed to less costs of issuing capital at short notice and, as a result, tend to 
hold less equity capital. We define the dividend variable as a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the bank pays a dividend in a given year. 
 The expected effect of asset risk on the equity ratio is positive according to both 
the corporate finance literature and the buffer view of capital. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
finds a negative effect of asset risk on firms’ leverage under the tradeoff theory 
assumption that firms with more volatile cash flows face higher expected costs of 
financial distress and have a lower probability of fully utilizing tax shields. In addition, 
they argue that risk is detrimental for stockholder co-investment. On the other hand, 
according to the buffer view the argument used for the positive effect of asset risk on 
banks’ equity capital is that we should expect the size of buffers to depend on the 
probability of falling below the regulatory minimum capital and, therefore, more risky 
banks tend to have more capital in excess of this minimum. Asset risk is measured as 
the annualized standard deviation of daily stock price returns times the market value of 
equity over the market value of the bank. 
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Finally, we provide an explanation on how we measure the macroeconomic 
variables included in the regression. It is important to control for a set of 
macroeconomic variables in our model given the expected high exposure of banks 
activity to the economy of each country. The GDP growth is measured as the annual 
percentage change of gross domestic product, inflation is the annual percentage change 
in the average consumer price index, stock market volatility is the annualized standard 
deviation of the daily national stock market index return and the term structure spread is 
the difference between the 10 year and the 3 month interest rate on government bonds.  
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
We obtain information about banks’ consolidated balance sheets and income statements 
from the Bankscope database of the Bureau van Dijk, information about banks’ stock 
prices and dividends from Thompson Financial’s Datastream database, and information 
about country level economic data from the World Economic Outlook database of the 
IMF. Our sample starts in 2004 and ends in 2010. This period selection allows us to 
examine four years before the international financial crisis (2004-2007) and three years 
where the markets have been affected by this crisis (2008-2010). We select only 
publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in a total of 560 banks, 
where 379 are from the US and 181 from 22 European countries. Observations of banks 
with negative capital in any given year were excluded in that year. Because some 
institutions did not have complete data for the sample period our panel is unbalanced.  
 The Bankscope database has been used in a series of studies in the banking 
literature. For example, Gropp and Heider (2010) use the database in the context of 
leverage, while Shehzad and De Haan (2013) use the database in the context of the 
financial crisis literature. The financial information at the bank level is presented in 
standardized formats, after adjusting for differences in accounting and reporting 
standards. Initially each country in Bankscope has its own data template, therefore 
allowing for differences in the accounting and reporting conventions. Then, the data is 
converted to a universal format using a globally standardized template derived from the 
country-specific templates. This universal format also provides standard financial ratios, 
which can be used for comparisons across banks from different countries. As pointed 
out by Pasiouras et al. (2006), Bankscope is a very comprehensive database that allows 
cross country comparisons and is commonly used by Fitch and other major rating 
agencies.  The final sample consists of 3,496 bank-year observations, which includes 
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2,393 observations from the US and 1,103 from Europe. Table 2 depicts the number of 
banks and bank-years across countries in our sample.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our 
estimations. Like in Gropp and Heider (2010) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012), our 
sample reveals that banks’ share of equity capital is substantially different from that of 
non-financial firms. Banks’ mean equity ratio in market terms is 16.5% and mean equity 
ratio in book terms is 11.4%, whereas Frank and Goyal (2009) document that the mean 
market and book equity ratio of non-financial firms is 72% and 71%, respectively.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
The results also illustrate a relatively high dispersion of banks’ equity ratios. 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the book capital ratio (book value of equity over 
total assets) and it shows an important dispersion of the capital ratio, varying from 
almost 0 to 100%. This pattern is further confirmed by Figure 2 with the distribution of 
the Tier 1 capital ratio. Moreover, we find that, on average, banks hold capital well 
above the regulatory minimum as the mean Tier 1 capital ratio is 14.9%, whereas the 
minimum regulatory ratio is 4%.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
There is a considerable heterogeneity in the cross section based on banks’ size. 
The mean book value of assets is 592,627 thousand euros, whereas the median is only 
1,724 thousand euros. Moreover, the largest bank in the sample has an asset value of 
2,586,701 thousand euros, while the smallest bank has an asset value of 2 thousand 
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euros. A comparison of our descriptive statistics for banks with those for non-financial 
firms of Frank and Goyal (2009) reveals that while non-financial firms have a mean 
market-to-book ratio closer to one, banks have a mean ratio of 1,21. Banks are, on 
average, less profitable than firms: the mean profitability of banks is 3.3%, whereas of 
non-financial firms it is 12%. Furthermore, banks have higher collateral ratios than non-
financial firms, 90% versus 56% of book value of assets, respectively. While an average 
of 87% of banks pay dividends, only 43% of non-financial firms do so. Finally, we find 
that banks are less risky than non-financial firms as the mean asset volatility of banks is 
5,8% and the mean asset volatility of non-financial firms in Frank and Goyal (2009) is 
12%.  
Before we proceed with the discussion of the results of the econometric model, 
we briefly examine the correlation among the main bank-specific variables based on the 
correlations of Table 4. The sign of the correlations is in line with those typically found 
in the empirical corporate finance literature. Banks with higher growth opportunities, 
higher profitability and that typically pay dividends hold, on average, more equity 
capital. Also, larger banks and banks with more collateral are, on average, more debt 
financed. Finally, riskier banks tend to have more equity.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
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4. Results 
We discuss the results of the capital structure model in four sections. First, we examine 
the determinants of banks’ excess equity capital for the full sample and analyze whether 
the pure regulatory view of capital holds for banks’ capital structure. If capital 
regulation is not the primary determinant of capital structure, we then compare the 
predictions of the corporate finance literature with those of the buffer view of capital. 
Second, we examine potential differences in the results of the capital structure model 
according to the region to where the bank belongs (Europe versus United States) and to 
the type of bank considered, namely comparing categories of banks based on size, 
growth opportunities and leverage.  Next, we analyze the effect of the international 
financial crisis on the results of the regression model. Finally, we further investigate the 
effect of the regulatory environment on banks’ capital by introducing into the original 
model of excess equity capital several regulatory variables that may vary across 
countries and time. 
 
4.1 The determinants of banks’ excess equity capital: the corporate finance view 
versus the buffer view 
In this section we analyze the regression results of estimating Equation (1) based on the 
full sample of bank-years observations, i.e. considering the panel of banks from both 
Europe and the United States. As point out previously in Section 2, we consider three 
measures of excess equity capital, namely the market and the book equity ratios in 
excess of the regulatory minimum of 4%, and the Tier 1 capital ratio also in excess of 
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this minimum.4 In order to decide whether to apply a random or a fixed effects 
estimator we used Hausman (1978) test. The test suggested that the key random effect 
assumption (unobserved effect is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable) is true, 
and then the random effects were used. Table 5 depicts the results of the excess equity 
model, with report of the estimated coefficients and the corresponding standard error 
and elasticity.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 In model 1A, where the dependent variable is the excess equity capital measured 
in market values, we find that, among the variables associated with banks’ specific 
characteristics, all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
suggests that, at least at a first glance, the pure regulatory view does not apply to banks’ 
capital structure. This leads us to examine then how the excess equity capital is affected 
by these banks’ characteristics, in particular how the sign of the estimated coefficients is 
consistent with the predictions of the corporate finance literature or the buffer view of 
capital. 
 The excess market equity regression shows that all estimated coefficients 
regarding the banks’ specific factors have the same sign as in the empirical corporate 
finance literature of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009), which 
provides evidence that the standard determinants of the capital structure of non-financial 
firms are also the main determinants of banks’ capital structure. Furthermore, we find 
that the sign of the estimated coefficients for the market-to-book ratio, profits and 
dividends is at odds with the predictions of the buffer view of capital, suggesting that 
the buffer view does not seems to apply to the banks’ capital structure decision. The 
                                                            
4  Previous related papers have used frequently book and market measures of equity or leverage ratios, 
with consistent results. While Gropp and Heider (2010) uses both market and book measures, Welch 
(2004) focus on the market measure and Barclay et al. (2006) on the book measure. 
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buffer view predicts that banks with higher growth opportunities, higher profits and 
higher frequency of dividend payment should hold less equity capital in excess of the 
regulatory minimum, since these banks are expected to face lower costs of issuing 
equity capital in the short run, but we find that these banks tend to hold more capital 
buffers.  
 Although globally the results are inconsistent with the buffer view of capital, 
there are two estimated coefficients in the excess market equity regression that may 
support the buffer view. First, the negative coefficient for banks’ size suggests that 
larger banks may have smaller buffers because they are better known to the market and 
can issue equity capital more easily on the short run. Second, the positive coefficient for 
the banks’ asset risk can be an indication that riskier banks hold larger buffers since 
these banks have a higher probability of falling below the regulatory minimum capital. 
 The findings of the excess book equity regression, model 1B, concerning the 
banks’ specific variables, are consistent with the results of the excess market equity 
regression, with the exception of the sign of the market-to-book ratio coefficient, which 
is now negative at a 5 percent level, and the estimated coefficient of the dividend 
variable that turns out to be insignificant. Overall, the book leverage regression 
confirms that for most bank-specific variables the sign of the estimated coefficients 
supports the standard corporate finance literature. 
 Then, the Tier 1 excess capital regression, model 1C, further confirms the results 
of model 1A, where the excess capital is measured in market values. The only 
difference in the results concerning the bank-specific variables relies on the sign of the 
dividend coefficient. In the Tier 1 excess capital regression we find that banks that pay 
dividends tend to hold less capital in excess of the regulatory minimum of 4%.  
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 Finally, as far as the macroeconomic variables are concerned, we find that the 
excess equity capital tend to be associated with lower GDP growth, lower inflation, 
lower term structure of interest rates and higher stock market volatility. 
 In sum, the estimation results of the excess equity model agree with the results 
of Gropp and Heider (2010) that regulation is not the primary determinants of banks’ 
equity share of equity. The factors affecting the level of equity of non-financial firms 
play an important role in explaining banks’ equity capital. Also, our findings provide 
support for the empirical corporate finance literature and, for most bank-specific 
variables, are at odds with the buffer view of capital. At last, we confirm the importance 
of macroeconomic variables in the level of banks’ excess equity capital.  
 
 
 
4.2 The determinants of banks’ excess equity capital for different banks’ 
characteristics and the effect of the international financial crisis 
In this section we investigate whether the model’s results vary according to some banks’ 
characteristics. In particular, we analyze if the effect of each explanatory variable on the 
excess equity capital is different for European and US Banks, large and small banks, 
high growth and low growth banks and high leverage and low leverage banks. The 
study of a “region effect” is important since regulatory requirements may apply to 
different regions and, although globalization made the European and US economies 
strongly related, the literature recognizes some differences in the way businesses are 
conducted in Europe and in the United States. For instance, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) 
identify some differences in the pattern of leverage for US and European banks. Then, 
the study of the sensitivity of the excess equity model to categories of banks based on 
size, growth opportunities and leverage constitutes a new contribution to the banking 
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literature. It extends the work of Frank and Goyal (2009) that has examined this issue 
for non-financial firms.  
 Next, we investigate whether the level of banks’ excess equity has changed over 
time and whether the factors determining this excess equity have the same effect before 
and during the international financial crisis. In the last few years the financial news 
documented how the international financial crisis has put pressure on governments and 
regulatory entities to adjust the regulatory environment where banks operate. As profit 
maximizing entities, banks naturally adjust their strategy, in particular their capital 
structure decisions to the business cycle. As Shehzad and De Haan (2013) point out, the 
recent crisis mainly affected banks operating in industrial economies, therefore it is 
important to study a possible crisis effect in our model that relies on a sample of 
European and US banks.  
 We depart from model 1 and now incorporate into the model one dummy 
variable that captures the category of the bank and a vector of variables that consist of 
this dummy variable times each explanatory variable. In the first model of this section, 
model 2, the dummy variable EUR takes the value of 1 if the bank is European and zero 
otherwise. In model 3, banks are defined as being large if they are equal of above 
percentile 75 in terms of the variable size. Therefore, the dummy variable Large is 1 for 
large banks and zero otherwise. In model 4, we classify banks as a high growth banks if 
they have a market-to-book ratio equal or above percentile 75. Thus, the dummy 
variable High growth takes the value of 1 for high growth banks and zero otherwise. 
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Then, in model 5, the dummy variable High leverage is 1 for banks that have a market 
leverage ratio equal or above percentile 75 and zero otherwise.5 
The study of the international financial crisis effect is conducted with the same 
framework. We use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years of the 
international financial crisis (2008 to 2010) and zero for the previous years (2004 to 
2007) and further incorporate into the model the vector of variables consisting of this 
dummy variable times each explanatory variable.   
 
4.2.1 Region effect: European versus US banks 
The findings of the model that intends to capture a region effect, model 2, are depicted 
in Table 6. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
The estimated coefficients of the dummy variable EUR reveal that European 
banks have, on average, more excess equity capital, either in market or book terms 
(models 2A and 2B, respectively), or considering the Tier 1 excess equity capital 
(model 2C). This result is consistent with the evolution of the market equity ratio over 
time, as depicted in Figure 3, which shows that European banks tend to have mean 
equity ratios above US banks over the period 2004-2010.  
 (Insert Figure 3 here) 
                                                            
5 We keep the same definition of the variables size and market-to-book ratio of Table 1. Market leverage 
is defined as the sum of total liabilities over the market value of total assets. To avoid multicollinearity, in 
the regression that incorporates the dummy variable of large banks we exclude the initial variable log of 
size since this dummy variable already captures the size. The same rationing explains the exclusion of the 
variable market-to-book ratio in the model that incorporates the dummy variable of banks with high 
growth opportunities. 
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Moreover, the results of model 2A, the one that considers as dependent variable 
the excess market equity capital, show that size is the only bank-specific variable for 
which there is no difference on its effect for European and US banks, as the estimated 
coefficient of the variable EUR times size is not statistically significant. The positive 
effect on the excess market equity capital of profitability and dividends is, on average, 
less pronounced for European banks, whereas the positive effect of the market-to-book 
ratio and asset risk is more pronounced for European banks. The estimated coefficients 
associated with collateral show that although this variable has a negative effect over the 
excess market equity capital of European banks, it has no effect on the excess market 
equity capital of US banks.  
The findings of the excess book equity regression, model 2B, confirm that the 
positive effect of asset risk on the excess equity is more pronounced for European 
banks. Moreover, the results show that although the market-to-book ratio has a negative 
effect on the excess book equity capital of US banks, it has a positive effect over the 
excess book equity of European banks. In addition, we observe that the variables 
profitability, size and collateral have stronger effects on the excess book equity capital 
of European banks.  
Finally, the results of the Tier 1 excess capital regression, model 2C, confirm, 
once again, that the effect of the asset risk over the excess capital is of higher magnitude 
for European banks. In addition, the effect of the market-to-book ratio, profitability and 
collateral is more pronounced for European banks, whereas the effect of banks’ size is 
negative but only for US banks.  
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4.2.2 Size effect: Large versus small banks 
Table 7 presents the estimation results of model 3, the one that investigates the 
size effect on the excess equity capital.   
(Insert Table 7 here) 
The results of model 3A, where the dependent variable is the excess market 
equity capital, show that the sign and statistic significance of the estimated coefficient 
of the dummy variable for large banks agrees with our previous discussion that larger 
banks have, on average, less capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. This is in line 
with the findings of Figure 4 that documents lower mean market equity ratios for larger 
banks over our sample period.  
(Insert Figure 4 here) 
Furthermore, model 3A shows that for most bank-specific variables the effect of 
each variable on the excess market equity is, on average, stronger for smaller banks as 
compared with larger banks. This holds for profitability, dividend payments and asset 
risk. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for collateral reveals that this variable has 
no effect on the excess market equity of larger banks but has the predicted corporate 
finance positive effect on the excess market equity of smaller banks. Only the effect of 
the market-to-book ratio is more pronounced for larger banks.  
In line with model 3A, the results of model 3B show that the effect of 
profitability over the excess book equity is less pronounced for larger banks. In 
addition, they show that while the variables collateral and asset risk have an effect over 
the excess book equity of smaller banks, they have no effect on the excess book equity 
of larger banks. We also find that the effect of the variable market-to-book ratio is 
stronger for larger banks.  
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At last, the results of the Tier 1 excess capital regression, model 3C, reveal that 
while the variables collateral and dividends have an effect on the excess Tier 1 capital 
of smaller banks, they have no effect on the excess capital of larger banks. Furthermore, 
the growth opportunities effect is more pronounced for larger banks and the profitability 
variable has opposite effects for smaller and larger banks.  
 
4.2.3 Growth opportunities effect: high growth  versus low growth banks 
The results of the model that incorporates a dummy variable for the market-to-
book ratio, model 4, are depicted in Table 8.  
(Insert Table 8 here) 
Both the regressions of the excess market equity ratio and excess Tier 1 capital 
ratio confirm our debate that banks with higher growth opportunities tend to have more 
capital in excess of the regulatory minimum of 4%, as the estimated coefficient 
associated with this dummy variable is positive and statistically significant in both 
regressions. This is consistent with Figure 5, as from 2004 to 2010 the mean market 
equity ratio is always higher for banks with higher market-to-book ratios. 
(Insert Figure 5 here) 
Furthermore, based on the estimation of the excess market equity regression, 
model 4A, we find that while profitability tend to have a lower effect on high growth 
banks, asset risk has a stronger effect on this category of banks. Then, although size, 
collateral and dividends have an effect on the excess market equity for low growth 
banks, they have no effect on the excess market equity of high growth banks.  
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The results of model 4B provide evidence that the effect of profitability, size and 
asset risk on the excess book equity is more pronounced in high growth banks, while the 
effect of collateral is weaker on these banks as compared with the effect on low growth 
banks.  
Then, based on the estimations results of model 4C we conclude that all bank-
specific variables have a stronger effect on the excess Tier 1 capital of high growth 
banks, with the exception of the dividend variable that has no effect on this dependent 
variable for both categories of banks.  
 
4.2.4 Leverage effect: high leverage versus low leverage banks 
In model 5 we discuss whether the explanatory variables affect differently banks 
measure of excess equity according to their level of leverage, i.e. based on banks being 
considered high levered or low levered. The results are depicted in Table 9. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
We observe that, on average, the effects of the bank-specific variables on the 
excess equity measure are of smaller scale for high leverage banks. This holds for 
profitability, size, dividends and asset risk considering the three measures of the 
dependent variable, i.e. models 5A, 5B and 5C. As far as the market-to-book ratio is 
concerned, while it has no effect on the excess market equity ratio of high leverage 
banks, it has a stronger effect on the excess book equity ratio of these banks. Then, we 
find that the effect of the market-to-book ratio in the excess Tier 1 capital is positive for 
low leverage banks but is negative for high leverage banks. At last, it is interesting to 
observe that the effect of collateral is contrary for low and high leverage banks 
according to models 5B and 5C. For low leverage banks greater levels of collateral tend 
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to have a negative effect on the share of equity capital above the regulatory minimum, 
whereas for high leverage banks this effect tends to be positive.  
 
4.2.5 International financial crisis effect 
The findings of model 6, the one that incorporates the dummy variable for the 
years of the recent international financial crisis, are presented in Table 10. Only in 
model 6B, where the dependent variable is the excess book equity capital, we find 
evidence that banks tend to have more excess equity capital during the years of the 
recent international financial crisis. This agrees with Quijano (2013), who points out 
that the recent financial crisis created a natural experiment where huge amounts of 
equity were injected into banks’ balance sheets in order to reduce their capital fragility.  
(Insert Table 10 here) 
Moreover, as far as the excess market equity regression is concerned, model 6A, 
we find that the variables market-to-book, size and collateral exhibit a greater effect on 
the excess market equity during the years of the financial crisis. Conversely, the effect 
of dividends and asset risk is less pronounced during these years and there is no effect 
for profitability. 
The existence of no profitability effect over the excess equity during the years of 
the international financial crisis is further confirmed in models 6B and 6C. In addition, 
these models show, as in model 6A, that the effect of collateral on excess capital is 
stronger during the crisis, whereas the effect of asset risk is weaker during the crisis. As 
regards size, the results of models 6B and 6C show an opposite behavior as in model 
6A, since this variable has a less pronounced effect on the excess capital during the 
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crisis. The same applies to the market-to-book ratio, but now only in model 6C, given 
that in model 6B this variable has no effect on the excess book value of equity during 
the crisis. 
 
4.3 Regulation measures and the excess equity capital 
In this section we exploit the cross country nature of our dataset to explicitly identify a 
potential effect of regulation on the equity capital above the regulatory minimum. In 
section 3 we provided an indirect test for the effect of regulation on the excess equity 
capital by analyzing whether banks’ excess equity is affected by a set of bank-specific 
factors. We have concluded that since banks’ excess capital is affected by these factors, 
regulation does not constitute a first order determinant of capital structure. Now, 
following Brewer et al. (2008), we provide a direct test for the effect of regulation on 
capital structure by adding to the original excess equity model two sets of country 
specific regulatory factors that may help to explain cross country differences in excess 
equity capital among commercial banks and bank holding companies.  
The first set of variables is from the 2012 World Bank’s Doing Business Data 
Set, with available data for the period 2007-2010. It provides two indices: one for the 
protection of shareholders rights and the other for the protection of investor rights in the 
country. It is based on bank country level data from Caprio et al. (2007) and these 
variables measure the extent to which a country’s ownership structure and investor 
rights protection influences its bank capital ratio. The indices take values between 1 and 
10, where a higher value means more protection. Caprio et al. (2007) argues that a large 
value for the shareholders rights protection index may reflect a stronger owners’ ability 
to expropriate bank resources. Therefore, higher values of this variable are likely to be 
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associated with greater risk taking by banks and lower capital ratios. Similarly, we 
should expect higher values for the investors’ rights protection index to be associated 
with less excess equity capital by banks.  
The second set of variables is from the Bank Regulation Data Set of Barth et al. 
(2012). This data set is derived from a survey conducted by the World Bank on bank 
regulation and supervision practices across countries, with data available also for the 
period 2007-2010. We use two of the most representative variables in the dataset. The 
first, called monitoring index, measures the level of efficiency of monitoring banks’ 
activity. Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012), we define this variable as a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the top ten banks in the country are all rated by 
international rating agencies, if off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public, if 
banks must disclose risk management procedures to the public and if subordinated debt 
is part of regulatory capital. The index is zero otherwise. Therefore, when this value 
takes the value of 1 there is a greater level of efficiency of monitoring banks’ activity, 
which can be understood as a stricter regulation. The second variable is the overall 
restrictiveness index. It measures the extent to which banks may engage in three sorts of 
activities: real estate, insurance and securities activities. Each of these activities leads to 
a separate index that takes a value between 1 and 4, where a value of 1 indicates no 
restriction and a value of 4 means these activities cannot be conducted. The overall 
restrictiveness index is the sum of the three separate indices and therefore it takes a 
value between 3 and 12, where a higher number means more restrictiveness or stricter 
regulation.  Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) predicts that stricter regulation should lead to 
lower banks’ level of  equity capital as banks operating in a stricter regulatory 
environment typically hold less risky assets or higher quality assets, which lowers the 
requirements to hold equity capital.   
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We decided to present only the results of the excess Tier 1 capital model since 
the Tier 1 capital in excess of the regulatory minimum of 4% is the variable that really 
captures the excess capital as defined by the regulatory banking entities. These results 
are depicted in Table 11.6 The findings show that three out of the four estimated 
coefficients of the regulatory variables have a negative sign and are statistically 
significant. On one hand, this agrees with Caprio et al. (2007) prediction that higher 
shareholder’s and investor’s protection in the country is likely to imply greater risk 
taking by banks and lower proportion of equity capital. On the other hand, we confirm 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) result that in a stricter regulatory environment, with greater 
efficiency of monitoring banks’ activity and greater business restrictiveness, banks tend 
to have less equity capital in excess of the regulatory minimum.  
(Insert Table 11 here) 
Next, we investigate whether the effect of regulation on banks’ excess Tier 1 
capital ratio varies through the years in our sample, i.e. we try to identify a potential 
temporal pattern of the regulation effect. Thus, we now incorporate into the previous 
excess Tier 1 regressions of Table 11 a set of year-dummy interactions with the 
regulatory variables. Since we only have available data for the regulatory variables for 
the period 2007 to 2010, the year of 2007 is left out in the interaction. The findings are 
presented in Table 12. First, the results show that, with the exception of the monitoring 
index measure, in model 8C, the estimated coefficients of the year-dummy interaction 
terms are statistically significant. This suggests the existence of a temporal effect of 
regulation on leverage. Second, if we consider only the regressions where the year-
dummy interaction coefficients are statistically significant, model 8A, 8B and 8D, we 
                                                            
6  Note, however, that the estimations of the excess market and book equity capital regressions reveal 
similar results as regards the effect of the regulatory variables on these measures of excess capital and 
therefore, they may be omitted from the main results.  
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observe that for all the years a higher investor and shareholder rights’ protection and a 
stricter regulation leads, on average, to higher Tier 1 capital ratios in excess of 4%.  
(Insert Table 12 here) 
Finally, if we consider only the models for shareholders and investor rights 
protection, we conclude from the magnitude of the estimated coefficients that the 
negative effect of these regulatory measures on the excess Tier 1 capital ratio is stronger 
for the year of 2008, followed by the year of 2007. This agrees with the results of 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) and further confirms the existence of a temporal effect of 
regulation on banks’ excess equity capital. In the years of 2007 and 2008 the US and 
European economies were more vulnerable to the international financial crisis and the 
effect of these regulatory measures were more evident on the restriction of banks’ 
equity capital and, as a consequence, on the increase of market leverage. The model that 
incorporates the overall restrictiveness variable, model 8D, further reveals that in the 
years of 2007 and 2008 the effect of this variable on the excess Tier 1 capital is more 
evident. The difference is that, in this model, the effect is stronger in 2007 than in 2008.   
Overall, we conclude that although regulation is not a first order determinant of 
banks’ capital structure, there is a negative effect of some regulatory measures on the 
excess Tier 1 capital and this effect is more pronounced in 2007 and 2008, which 
provides evidence of a temporal effect of regulation on banks’ capital structure.  
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5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relevance of regulatory capital requirements in determining 
banks’ capital structure. It examines whether banks’ capital structure is fully determined 
by capital requirements. If capital requirements are of second order importance, it 
investigates which bank-specific and market factors play an important role in 
determining banks’ excess equity capital. Motivated by a considerable dispersion in 
banks’ equity ratios, it compares the predictions of banks’ equity ratios proposed by the 
buffer view of capital with the predictions proposed by the empirical corporate finance 
literature for non-financial firms. Moreover, it investigates whether the results of the 
determinants of banks’ excess equity capital may vary with the region to where the bank 
belongs and to the type of bank considered, in particular if they are variations for large 
versus small banks, high grow versus low growth banks and high leverage versus low 
leverage banks. It then studies the effect of the recent international financial crisis on 
the results and provides a direct test for the effect of regulation on the excess equity 
capital. 
 The study is conducted in a panel of 560 banks, 379 from the US. and 181 from 
Europe, for the years of 2004 to 2010. A typical corporate finance equity model is 
estimated for the full sample and then the model is further developed to incorporate the 
other dimensions of the analysis.  
 The main contribution of the study relies on the dataset used, as it comprises 
data for a recent time period, covering the years before the recent international crisis 
(2004 to 2007) and during the crisis (2008 to 2010), and on the methodology employed, 
since we investigate the determinants of excess equity not only for the full sample of 
banks but also for categories of banks based on the region where the banks has its 
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headquarters and on the type of bank. Moreover, we provide an important contribution 
to the literature on the effect of regulatory country factors on banks’ capital structure.  
 We find that banks’ capital structure is not fully determined by capital 
regulation. In fact, the results show a strong similarity in the factors commonly 
determining the capital structure of non-financial firms and the factors affecting the 
capital structure of banks. Our results provide support for the empirical corporate 
finance predictions on the determinants of firms’ capital structure and do not seem to 
validate the buffer view of capital requirements. Indeed, we find that banks’ excess 
equity capital is positively related with banks’ growth opportunities, profitability, 
dividends and risk and negatively related with size and collateral. Macroeconomic 
factors as the GDP growth, inflation, the national stock market volatility and the term 
structure of interest rates also play a role in enplaning banks’ capital structure.  
 We confirm the existence of a region effect since the results show that European 
banks have, on average, more equity capital, and for most bank-specific variables their 
effect on banks’ excess equity depends on whether the bank is European or from the 
US. We also document differences on the effect of most variables on banks’ excess 
equity according to the type of bank. For instance, we observe that, on average, the 
effects of the bank-specific variables on excess equity are of greater scale for smaller 
banks and for low leverage banks.  
 Our paper provides evidence that the recent international financial crisis has an 
important effect in banks’ excess equity capital. We find that during the crisis banks’ 
have, on average, less equity capital and that not all variables affect banks’ excess 
equity with the same magnitude for the periods before and during the financial crisis. 
Finally, a direct test for the effect of regulation on the excess Tier 1 capital ratio reveals 
that although regulation is not a first order determinant of banks’ capital structure, there 
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is a negative effect of some regulatory measures on excess capital. Moreover, we 
provide evidence of a temporal effect of regulation on banks’ excess equity as this effect 
is more pronounced in 2007 and 2008. 
The findings documented in this paper can be an important tool for regulatory 
authorities and bank managers. It provides empirical evidence of the factors that 
determine banks’ capital structure and highlights that although regulatory capital 
requirements are not first order determinants of this capital structure, there are cross 
country factors that have to be taken into account in the capital structure of banks. We 
believe this paper can be further improved in future research with the addition of banks 
from less developed economies. This would provide a more detailed analysis of the 
effect of regulatory country factors on capital structure. Moreover, it would be 
important to investigate the determinants of the several components of banks’ leverage, 
as banks’ liabilities can consist of not only of the typical long term debt but also of 
deposits.
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Table 1. Definition of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables 
 
   
Variables Definition
Excess equity capital (market) Ratio of the market value of equity to market value of assets minus the regulatory minimum
capital of 4%.
Excess equity capital (book) Ratio of the book value of equity to market value of assets minus the regulatory minimum
capital of 4%.
Excess Tier 1 capital Ratio of the book value of equity over assets weighted by risk, as defined in Basel I, minus
the regulatory minimum capital of 4%.
Market-to-book ratio Market value of assets over the book value of assets.
Profitability Ratio of pre-tax profits and interest expenses over the book value of assets.
Size Value of total assets.
Collateral
Sum of total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks and
lands and buildings over the book value of assets.
Dividend Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank pays a dividend in a given year.
Asset risk Annualized standard deviation of daily stock price returns times the market value of equity
over the market value of the bank.
GDP growth Annual percentage change of gross domestic product.
Inflation Annual percentage change in the average consumer price index.
Stock market risk Annualized standard deviation of the daily national stock market index return. 
Term structure spread Difference between the 10 year interest rate and the 3 month interest rate on government
bonds.
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Table 2. Number of banks and bank-years across countries 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. 
 
  
Country Number of banks Bank-years
AT - Austria 6 41
BE - Belgium 4 24
CH - Switzerland 16 103
CY - Cyprus 3 21
DE - Germany 19 113
DK - Denmark 33 214
ES - Spain 8 55
FI - Finland 3 18
FR - France 11 61
GB - Great Britan 10 58
GR - Greece 11 73
IE - Ireland 2 11
IT - Italy 17 95
LI - Liechtenstein 1 7
LU - Luxembourg 2 10
MC - Monaco 1 6
MT - Malta 4 23
NL - Netherlands 6 36
NO - Norway 1 6
PT - Portugal 4 25
SE - Sweden 4 24
TR - Turkey 15 79
US - United States 379 2,393
Total Europe 181 1,103
Total United States 379 2,393
Total 560 3,496
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. 
 
  
N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 10 th 50 th 90 th
Excess equity capital (market) 3,496 0.125 0.140 -0.040 0.960 0.044 0.101 0.163
Excess equity capital (book) 3,496 0.074 0.117 -0.040 0.960 0.032 0.050 0.073
Excess Tier 1 capital 3,496 0.109 0.128 0.000 0.960 0.056 0.076 0.111
Book value of assets (thousand €) 3,496 592,627 232,238 2 2,586,701 594 1,724 9,129
Market value of bank (thousand €) 3,496 608,876 235,100 2 2,555,413 620 1,927 10,113
Market-to-book ratio 3,496 1.210 2.893 0.000 78.000 1.000 1.050 1.120
Profitability 3,453 0.033 0.056 -0.140 2.060 0.020 0.030 0.040
Collateral 3,496 0.900 0.099 0.000 1.000 0.890 0.920 0.940
Dividend 3,447 0.870 0.340 0 1 1 1 1
Asset risk 3,254 5.789 5.924 0.000 116.420 2.570 4.305 7.010
GDP growth 3,496 1.467 2.591 -8.230 9.360 -0.020 2.540 3.060
Inflation 3,496 2.470 1.640 -4.480 10.580 1.640 2.680 3.390
Stock market risk 3,496 19.819 10.667 8.240 56.030 10.900 15.680 26.810
Term structure spread 3,417 1.744 1.214 -5.383 5.759 0.407 1.937 2.856
Distribution
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Table 4. Correlations 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. Numbers between brackets indicate p-values. 
 
  
Excess 
equity 
capital 
(market)
Excess 
equity 
capital 
(book)
Excess 
Tier 1 
capital
Book value 
of assets 
(thousand €)
Market 
value of 
bank 
(thousand €)
Market- to-
book ratio
Profitability Collateral Dividend Asset 
risk
Excess equity 
capital 
(market)
1
Excess equity 
capital 
(book)
0,812   
(0,000)  
1
Excess Tier 1 
capital
0,862   
(0,000)  
0,868   
(0,000)  
1
Book value 
of assets 
(thousand €)
-0,164   
(0,000)
-0,122   
(0,000)
-0,104   
(0,000)
1
Market value 
of bank 
(thousand €)
-0,153  
(0,000)
-0,123   
(0,000)
-0,098   
(0,000)
0,999   
(0,000)
1
Market- to-
book ratio
0,301   
(0,000)
0,011 
(0,509)
0,257 
(0,000)
-0,016   
(0,346)
0,01 
(0,557)
1
Profitability 0,205   
(0,000)
0,204 
(0,000)
0,193 
(0,000)
-0,024 
(0,199)
-0,020 
(0,230)
0,013   
(0,439)
1
Collateral -0,296   
(0,000)
-0,275   
(0,000)
-0,295   
(0,000)
0,007   
(0,678)
0,005   
(0,757)
-0,004 
(0,830)
-0,123 
(0,000)
1
Dividend 0,146   
(0,000)
0,010  
(0,552)
0,021  
(0,217)
0,010   
(0,545)
0,014   
(0,415)
0,023   
(0,173)
-0,010   
(0,556)
-0,003   
(0,872)
1
Asset risk 0,704   
(0,000)
0,581 
(0,000)
0,614 
(0,000)
-0,134 
(0,000)
-0,126 
(0,000)
0,228   
(0,000)
0,202   
(0,000)
-0,342 
(0,000)
0,044 
(0,012)
1
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Table 5. Excess equity capital (market and book) and excess Tier 1 capital ratio 
models 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. The dependent variable is pointed out in the top 
of each column. Numbers between brackets indicate the standard error. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model 1A                            Model 1B                             Model 1C                      
Dependent variable Excess equity capital (market) Excess equity capital (book) Excess Tier 1 capital
Constant    0.333***   0.407***    0.462***
(0.028) (0.021) (0.029)
Market-to-book ratio    0.011***  -0.001**    0.020***
Standard error (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Elasticity   1.036 -0.021   0.0217
Profitability    1.074***   0.468***    0.562***
Standard error (0.038) (0.020) (0.036)
Elasticity   0.284  0.211   0.171
Log size   -0.016***  -0.012***   -0.014***
Standard error (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Elasticity  -1.300 -0.170   0.129
Collateral   -0.134***  -0.185***   -0.217***
Standard error (0.020) (0.012) (0.020)
Elasticity  -0.958 -2.265  -1.788
Dividend    0.032***  -0.001   -0.007**
Standard error (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Elasticity   0.218  -0.010  -0.059
Log asset risk    0.035***   0.008***    0.012***
Standard error (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Elasticity   0.281   0.103   0.109
GDP growth   -0.002*** -0.001**  -0.012**
Standard error (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Elasticity   0.022  -0.012  -0.017
Inflation   -0.003***  -0.000   -0.000
Standard error (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Elasticity  -0.065  -0.016  -0.003
Log stock market 
risk    0.012*** -0.003**  -0.001
Standard error (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Elasticity   0.097  -0.046  -0.006
Term structure 
spread   -0.002* -0.000  -0.002*
Standard error (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Elasticity  -0.023  -0.004  -0.014
R2     0.550     0.302     0.332
Number of banks      515      515      515
Number of 
observations   3,093   3,093   3,093
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Table 6. Excess equity capital models and the region effect 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. For each model, the dummy variable EUR takes 
the value of 1 is the bank is European and zero otherwise. Numbers between brackets indicate the 
standard error. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Model 2A                            Model 2B                             Model 2C                      
Dependent variable Excess equity capital (market) Excess equity capital (book) Excess Tier 1 capital
Estimate Estimate Estimate
   0.116***   0.158***   0.028***
(0.038) (0.028) (0.041)
   0.010***  -0.001**   0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   1.832***   0.233***   0.251***
(0.059) (0.033) (0.061)
  -0.010***  -0.003**  -0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
  -0.003  -0.071***  -0.077***
(0.026) (0.017) (0.028)
   0.031***  -0.000   0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
   0.031***   0.005***   0.006***
(0.018) (0.001) (0.002)
  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.001   0.000   0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.009**  0.002  0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
  -0.001 -0.001* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.202***  0.465***  0.166***
(0.056) (0.043) (0.061)
   0.210***  0.028***  0.139***
(0.014) (0.001) (0.014)
  -1.612***  0.264***  0.172**
(0.076) (0.042) (0.079)
  -0.004 -0.017*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
  -0.205*** -0.179*** -0.204***
(0.037) (0.023) (0.039)
  -0.021***  0.002 -0.010
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
   0.026***  0.013***  0.020***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
   0.002* -0.000  0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.003 -0.004*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
  -0.043*** -0.017*** -0.021***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
   0.001  0.004***  0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
R2     0.648     0.434     0.440
Number of banks      515      515      515
Number of 
observations   3,093   3,093   3,093
Constant
Dividend 
Collateral
Log size
Profitability
Market-to-book ratio
Log stock market 
risk
Inflation
GDP growth
Log asset risk
EUR × Dividend
EUR × Collateral
EUR × Log size
EUR × Profitability
EUR × Market-to-
book ratio
EUR
Term structure 
spread
EUR × Term 
structure spread
EUR × Log stock 
market risk
EUR × Inflation
EUR × GDP growth
EUR × Log asset 
risk
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Table 7. Excess equity capital models and the size effect 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. For each model, the dummy variable Large 
takes the value of 1 is the bank is above percentile 75 for the variable size and zero otherwise. Numbers 
between brackets indicate the standard error. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 
5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model 3A                            Model 3B                             Model 3C                      
Dependent variable Excess equity capital (market) Excess equity capital (book) Excess Tier 1 capital
Estimate Estimate Estimate
   0.063***   0.214***   0.228***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.022)
   0.010***  -0.001*   0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   1.057***   0.538***   0.671***
(0.039) (0.021) (0.039)
  -0.119***  -0.178***  -0.192***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.022)
   0.036***   0.000  -0.010***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
   0.043***   0.008***   0.015***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
   0.002** -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
  -0.004***  -0.001  -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.018*** -0.002  0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
  -0.005*** -0.001* -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.499***  0.654**  0.007
(0.054) (0.031) (0.054)
   0.543*** -0.049***  0.073**
(0.288) (0.016) (0.029)
  -0.646*** -0.433*** -0.907***
(0.440) (0.075) (0.136)
   0.042 -0.002 -0.072
(0.044) (0.026) (0.045)
  -0.036*** -0.003  0.007
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
  -0.024***  0.000 -0.006*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
  -0.001  0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.003 -0.000  0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
  -0.027*** -0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
   0.007***  0.002  0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
R2     0.646     0.324     0.308
Number of banks      515      515      515
Number of 
observations   3,093   3,093   3,093
Large × Market-to-
book ratio
Constant
Market-to-book ratio
Profitability
Collateral
Dividend
Log asset risk
GDP growth
Inflation
Log stock market 
risk
Term structure 
spread
Large
Large × Log stock 
market risk
Large × Term 
structure spread
Large × Profitability
Large × Collateral
Large × Dividend
Large × Inflation
Large × GDP growth
Large × Log asset 
risk
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Table 8. Excess equity capital models and the growth opportunities effect 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. For each model, the dummy variable High 
growth takes the value of 1 is the bank is above percentile 75 for the variable market-to-book ratio and 
zero otherwise. Numbers between brackets indicate the standard error. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model 4A                            Model 4B                             Model 4C                      
Dependent variable Excess equity capital (market) Excess equity capital (book) Excess Tier 1 capital
Estimate Estimate Estimate
   0.343***   0.390***   0.388***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.032)
   1.036***   0.252***   0.274***
(0.051) (0.030) (0.060)
  -0.014***  -0.012***  -0.010***
(0.012) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.147***  -0.180***  -0.166***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.024)
   0.026***   0.003*  -0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
   0.028***   0.007***   0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
   0.001** -0.000 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
  -0.002**  -0.001   0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.003 -0.003* -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.070** -0.014  0.185***
(0.033) (0.020) (0.039)
  -0.296***  0.432***  0.511***
(0.067) (0.040) (0.079)
  -0.001 -0.004*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.014  0.062*** -0.060**
(0.021) (0.012) (0.025)
  -0.012 -0.015*** -0.005
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011)
   0.010***  0.004*  0.011***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
   0.000 -0.000  0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
  -0.001  0.001 -0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
   0.017***  0.002  0.025***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
  -0.004** -0.002 -0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
R2     0.598     0.323     0.372
Number of banks      515      515      515
Number of 
observations   3,093   3,093   3,093
High growth × Log 
stock market risk
High growth × Term 
structure spread
High growth × 
Profitability
High growth × 
Collateral
High growth × 
Dividend
High growth × 
Inflation
High growth × GDP 
growth
High growth × Log 
asset risk
High growth × Log 
size
GDP growth
Inflation
Log stock market 
risk
Term structure 
spread
High growth  
Constant
Profitability
Collateral
Dividend
Log asset risk
Log size
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Table 9. Excess equity capital models and the leverage effect 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. For each model, the dummy variable High 
leverage takes the value of 1 is the bank is above percentile 75 for the variable market leverage and zero 
otherwise. Numbers between brackets indicate the standard error. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model 5A                            Model 5B                             Model 5C                      
Dependent variable Excess equity capital (market) Excess equity capital (book) Excess Tier 1 capital
Estimate Estimate Estimate
   0.330***   0.430***   0.501***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.030)
   0.010***  -0.001**   0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.942***   0.498***   0.586***
(0.038) (0.021) (0.038)
  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.148***  -0.201***  -0.240***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.020)
   0.019***  -0.002  -0.008*
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
   0.033***   0.010***   0.016***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
   0.003*** -0.000  0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
  -0.006***  -0.001**  -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.021*** -0.001  0.005*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
  -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.036 -0.311*** -0.477***
(0.050) (0.027) (0.050)
  -0.297** -0.231*** -0.430***
(0.117) (0.063) (0.012)
   0.005***  0.006***  0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.005  0.247***  0.352***
(0.046) (0.024) (0.045)
  -0.011*  0.005 -0.002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
  -0.021*** -0.001 -0.008**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
  -0.004***  0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.008  0.001  0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
  -0.032*** -0.003 -0.012*
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
   0.004*  0.003***  0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
R2     0.601     0.331     0.367
Number of banks      515      515      515
Number of 
observations   3,093   3,093   3,093
High leverage × Log 
stock market risk
High leverage × 
Term structure 
spread
High leverage × 
Profitability
High leverage × 
Collateral
High leverage × 
Dividend
High leverage × 
Inflation
High leverage × 
GDP growth
High leverage × Log 
asset risk
High leverage × Log 
size
High leverage × 
Market-to-book ratio
Constant
Market-to-book ratio
Profitability
Collateral
Dividend
Log asset risk
GDP growth
Inflation
Log stock market 
risk
Term structure 
spread
Log size
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Table 10. Excess equity capital models and the crisis effect 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. For each model, the dummy variable Crisis 
takes the value of 1 for the years of the recent international financial crisis (2008-2010) and zero 
otherwise (2004-2007). Numbers between brackets indicate the standard error. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model 6A                            Model 6B                             Model 6C                      
Dependent variable Excess equity capital (market) Excess equity capital (book) Excess Tier 1 capital
Estimate Estimate Estimate
   0.284***   0.377***   0.458***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.031)
   0.009***  -0.001*   0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.557***   0.493***   0.488***
(0.063) (0.041) (0.073)
  -0.008***  -0.015***  -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.129***  -0.123***  -0.196***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.022)
   0.019***  -0.000  -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
   0.061***   0.006***   0.019***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
  -0.003***  0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
  -0.000  -0.002***  -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.008**  0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
   0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.002  0.077***  0.008
(0.023) (0.014) (0.026)
   0.004***  0.000 -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
   0.069  0.026  0.060
(0.068) (0.043) (0.079)
  -0.001*  0.003***  0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.113*** -0.105*** -0.067***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.018)
  -0.015***  0.001 -0.011*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
  -0.016*** -0.002 -0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
   0.004*** -0.001* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.001  0.002**  0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
   0.029*** -0.008*** -0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
  -0.000  0.003***  0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
R2     0.657     0.290     0.373
Number of banks      515      515      515
Number of 
observations   3,093   3,093   3,093
Crisis × Log stock 
market risk
Crisis × Term 
structure spread
Crisis × Profitability
Crisis × Collateral
Crisis × Dividend
Crisis × Inflation
Crisis × GDP 
growth
Crisis × Log asset 
risk
Crisis × Log size
Crisis × Market-to-
book ratio
Crisis
Constant
Market-to-book ratio
Profitability
Collateral
Dividend
Log asset risk
GDP growth
Inflation
Log stock market 
risk
Term structure 
spread
Log size
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Table 11. Excess Tier 1 capital model and regulation measures 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. Numbers between brackets indicate the standard 
error. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Model 7A                            Model 7B                             Model 7C                           Model 7D                      
Dependent variable Excess Tier 1 capital Excess Tier 1 capital Excess Tier 1 capital Excess Tier 1 capital
Regulation variable 
included in the model Investors rights Shareholders rights Monitoring index Overall restrictiveness
   0.588***   0.610***   0.473***    0.505***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.033) (0.035)
   0.015***   0.015***   0.015***    0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.604***   0.596***   0.671***    0.604***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042)
  -0.012***  -0.013***  -0.011***   -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.312***  -0.311***  -0.305***   -0.298***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
  -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.011**   -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
   0.010***   0.011***   0.008***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
  -0.001 -0.001  -0.000   -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.002  -0.002 -0.002*  -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0.005  0.005   0.009**    0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
  -0.001 -0.001  -0.002*   -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0.010*** -0.011***  0.007***  -0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
R2     0.419     0.425     0.399     0.411
Number of banks 491 491 496 484
Number of 
observations 1,745 1,745 1,734 1,714
Log asset risk
GDP growth
Inflation
Log stock market risk
Regulation variable
Term structure spread
Dividend
Constant
Market-to-book ratio
Profitability
Log size
Collateral
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Table 12. Excess Tier 1 capital model and the temporal effect of regulation 
The sample consists of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and 
the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010. Numbers between brackets indicate the standard 
error. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Model 8A                            Model 8B                             Model 8C                           Model 8D                      
Dependent variable Excess Tier 1 capital Excess Tier 1 capital Excess Tier 1 capital Excess Tier 1 capital
Regulation variable 
included in the model Investors rights Shareholders rights Monitoring index Overall restrictiveness
   0,541***   0,560***   0,433***    0,537***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.033) (0.037)
   0,015***   0,015***   0,016***    0,015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0,675***   0,665***   0,682***    0,693***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)
  -0,013***  -0,013***  -0,011***   -0,013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0,269***  -0,269***  -0,279***   -0,258***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
  -0,003  -0,003  -0,007*   -0,000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
   0,023***   0,023***   0,017***    0,021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
  -0,001* -0,001*  -0,001   -0,001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0,001  -0,002 -0,002  -0,002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
   0,005  0,005   0,008**    0,006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
  -0,001 -0,001  -0,002   -0,001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  -0,013*** -0,013***  0,038  -0,010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.048) (0.001)
  -0,001* -0,001* -0,042   0,001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000)
   0,001*  0,001* -0,034   0,002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000)
   0,004***  0,003*** -0,015   0,004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000)
R2     0.450     0.457     0.415     0.448
Number of banks 491 491 496 484
Number of 
observations 1,745 1,745 1,734 1,714
Constant
Profitability
Market-to-book ratio
Log stock market risk
Regulation variable
Regulation            
variable × 2010
GDP growth
Inflation
Log size
Collateral
Dividend
Log asset risk
Regulation              
variable × 2008
Regulation           
variable × 2009
Term structure spread
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Figure 1. Distribution of book capital ratio 
The figure shows the distribution of banks’ book capital ratio (book equity divided by book assets) for the 
3,496 bank-year observations in our sample of 560 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding 
companies in Europe and in the US from the Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of Tier 1 capital ratio 
The figure shows the distribution of banks’ regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (equity over risk weighted 
assets as defined in Basel I) for 3,496 bank-year observations in our sample of 560 publicly traded 
commercial banks and bank-holding companies in Europe and in the US from the Bankscope database 
from 2004 to 2010.  
 
Figure 3. Evolution of mean market equity ratio for European versus US banks 
The figure shows the evolution of banks’ mean market equity ratio for European versus US banks of the 
181 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding in Europe and in the US from the Bankscope 
database from 2004 to 2010.  
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Figure 4. Evolution of mean market equity ratio for large versus small banks 
The figure shows the evolution of banks’ mean market equity ratio for large versus small banks of the 181 
publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding in Europe and in the US from the Bankscope 
database from 2004 to 2010.  
 
Figure 5. Evolution of mean market equity ratio for high growth versus low 
growth banks 
The figure shows the evolution of banks’ mean market equity ratio for high growth versus low growth 
banks of the 181 publicly traded commercial banks and bank-holding in Europe and in the US from the 
Bankscope database from 2004 to 2010.  
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